The fate of Georgia

“What pleasure does the tender nightingale receive from honour if it is in a cage?“

The Nightingale (Part One)

Batumi, Adjara, Georgia

Sunday, Ides of November 2026

The rain, the grey sky, the quiet apartment.

I sit with my journal and laptop, reluctant to begin the day’s work.

Heaven may be unhappy with Batumi.

Many tears shed upon it.

Reluctance retreats in the wake of recollection.

Above: Batumi, Adjara, Georgia

An invite to dinner at a Georgian restaurant.

Imagine a woman from a K place and a man from a different K place sharing a hotel apartment.

No PDA is obvious so I am uncertain whether they are a couple.

She will fly away soon.

He will return to his homeland a fortnight later.

Above: Kowloon, China

Above: Köln (Cologne), Germany

I, the invited, pay for dinner and give her a souvenir bottle of chacha.

The food is superb and worth every lari.

Above: Georgian supra

But what wasn’t so palatable is her open admission that I had been invited because I have a reputation for being generous.

I do not mind being generous.

It is my nature.

I pay because I detest the awkwardness of negotiating the bill.

Generosity is efficient.

But, truth be told, I had more enjoyable conversation with the wait staff than with the couple.

What the couple actually does to finance their travels is unclear.

Their answers are vague and they ask nothing about me.

Not how I am.

Not how have I been.

What bothers me is the lack of empathy at the table.

I find greater authenticity in the food and from those who serve it than in the two people sharing a table with me.

There is no shortage of cosmopolitan people travelling around the world.

International addresses, interesting passports and stories of distant destinations do not necessarily make interesting company.

I was invited to a social situation.

I act sociable.

The mood is restrained, constrained, discomfited.

To be fair, not every encounter produces a friendship, a memorable experience or a traveller’s tale.

But the guest has to sing for his supper that he then pays.

I provide the entertainment and the hospitality, but there is no sense of gratitude nor reciprocal curiosity as to my existence.

I want to be a participant in the conversation, not its facilitator.

I already do that latter role every Sunday in my conversation class.

The evening feels less like a celebration of a reunion than a calculation.

Courtesy lacking.

What strikes me most is not the lack of reciprocity, but rather my lack of surprise at the lack of reciprocity.

I am not so much disappointed as disillusioned.

People will be as they are and eventually who they are they will reveal.

Indifference reminds me of how lonely a person can feel even in the company of others.

A person tires of chasing after courtesy, desiring dignity, aching for acknowledgement.

I grant the argument that each individual is different from others.

I grant the argument that I cannot know anyone completely or why they act as they do.

I grant the argument that I have no control for what people do or who they are.

I can only hope to control how I react.

Perhaps the couple is closer than they show.

Perhaps her anticipated departure bothers them.

What I cannot comprehend is my solicited participation on this – her last evening in Georgia.

I went to dinner expecting nothing extraordinary.

I was prepared to be sociable, hospitable and generous.

I did not demand friendship, intimacy or even particularly stimulating conversation.

I simply hoped to be treated as another person at the table, rather than as the person who would finance the evening and keep the conversation moving.

I don’t resent paying for dinner.

I resent discovering that my willingness to pay might have been the principal reason for the invitation.

Those are quite different things.

I was simultaneously the guest, the entertainment, the host and the payer.

I enjoyed the company of the wait staff more than that of my dinner companions.

Perhaps because the wait staff were engaged in an uncomplicated exchange.

They served.

I acknowledged.

We conversed.

There was an immediacy and authenticity to the interaction.

I was not required to perform.

Above: “Be Our Guest”, Beauty and the Beast (1991)

In my classes, I spend considerable time creating opportunities for others to communicate.

I encourage, prompt, listen and facilitate.

But who facilitates the teacher?

Who asks about his experiences, his observations, his disappointments and his discoveries?

Who is curious about the person behind the passport?

I am not asking for extraordinary attention.

I am asking for ordinary human interest.

I am careful about drawing conclusions about their intentions.

I don’t know whether they are romantically involved, what their financial circumstances are or what prompted the invitation.

Her departure might indeed have been weighing on them.

But none of that changes my experience.

I was invited into their evening and found myself wondering why.

Perhaps that is the question worth retaining, rather than attempting to solve their relationship or their motivations.

Why invite someone into an intimate social occasion if there is so little interest in the person being invited?

I cannot know the answer.

A person can be surrounded by people and nevertheless experience profound solitude.

Last night, I was not physically alone.

I had food, drink, conversation and company.

Yet I experienced a certain absence.

Perhaps loneliness isn’t simply the absence of companionship.

It is the absence of recognition.

There is a distinction between wanting to be liked and wanting to be acknowledged.

The first seeks approval.

The second seeks recognition of one’s existence.

There is a distinction between being alone and experiencing loneliness.

One is a circumstance.

The other is an experience that can follow us even when surrounded by people.

People will be as they are and eventually who they are they will reveal.

We must allow ourselves to respond to what they reveal, rather than continually hoping they will become someone else.

The evening made me wish I had stayed home.

I can be alone without feeling lonely.

I do not wish to be amongst people whose company makes me keenly aware of my loneliness.

There is a difference between solitude freely chosen and loneliness experienced in company.

I can spend an evening alone in my Batumi apartment, read poetry, write in my journal, listen to the rain or simply watch the evening pass.

There is no obligation to entertain, no expectation to meet someone else’s needs and no need to justify your presence.

That solitude can be entirely fulfilling.

But to sit at a table with people and discover that my presence is valued more for what I provide than for who I am makes the experience of loneliness particularly acute.

This is not a rejection of people.

Quite the contrary.

I think it demonstrates that I still value genuine human connection enough to recognize its absence.

I don’t have to earn my place at somebody else’s table.

Nor need I demonstrate generosity, usefulness, intelligence or capacity to entertain before I deserve a seat.

I can simply arrive.

And I can leave when the company doesn’t suit me.

The loneliness of a solitary soul is not necessarily relieved by the company of others.

Sometimes the greatest comfort is found in the freedom to be alone without feeling abandoned.

I would not rush to make the experience into a grand lesson about humanity.

Two people are two people, not a representative sample of the world.

But I take seriously what the experience revealed about what I want from companionship.

I am not asking to be loved in exchange for dinner, generosity, entertainment or anything else I might provide.

I am asking for something much simpler, and perhaps much harder to find:

To be appreciated for my existence, rather than for my usefulness.

To have someone ask how I am, not because courtesy demands it, but because they are genuinely curious.

To have someone listen, not because I am entertaining them, but because what I have to say matters to them.

To be invited because my company is wanted, not because my generosity is anticipated.

There is no extravagance in those wishes.

And I want to distinguish something here.

Appreciation is not the same as approval, admiration or affection.

I don’t need everyone to like me.

I simply wish not to be invisible when I am present.

Perhaps this is why I write:

I write to remind myself that one reader suggests a shared solitude.

A reader who recognises something of themselves in my words offers a small but meaningful acknowledgement:

I see you.

I understand something of what you are saying.

I am here, too.

And perhaps that is enough for a moment.

I never want to become so accustomed to being useful that I forget I am worthy of being welcomed.

There is no desire to buy love.

I simply wish my existence to be appreciated.

My presence to be noted and my absence to be missed….

Sunday 16 May 2026

Tbilisi, Georgia

A bridge and an avenue in Tbilisi are named after the poet.

His monument stands in the central district of the Georgian capital.

The bridge, the thoroughfare and the monument each tell a slightly different story about how Nikoloz Baratashvili was incorporated into the city he left in 1844.

Above: Georgian poet Nikoloz Baratashvili (1817 – 1845)

The bridge crosses the Mtkvari River, connecting the central city with the Avlabari side.

It was designed in 1964 and built in 1965, replacing the earlier Mukhrani Bridge, an iron structure dating from 1911.

The present bridge was opened in 1966.

It was conceived as more than a river crossing:

Its original design included exhibition space and a café at the lower level.

But perhaps its most recognisable feature is the series of bronze figures depicting couples in affectionate poses along the railings.

The sculptural composition is called Youth, and is attributed to Gia (Giorgi) Japaridze.

Above: Youth

The bridge is consequently sometimes called the Bridge of Love.

There is an ironic association here:

A bridge named after a poet whose romantic life was marked by unrequited affection has become a popular place for representations of young love.

I wouldn’t claim that this was intended as a tribute to his romantic poetry, but the juxtaposition is irresistible.

Perhaps there is another small irony in the bridge.

It carries people from one bank of the Mtkvari to the other, while the poet’s words continue to carry his thoughts from one generation to another.

Above: Nikoloz Baratashvili Bridge, Tbilisi, Georgia

Baratashvili Street is a central thoroughfare running down towards the river and the bridge.

It lies along the edge of the old city, in an area whose urban character reflects several periods of Tbilisi’s development.

Its earlier names are interesting.

It was known as Mukhrani Street, and before that as Prison Boulevard.

It was renamed by the Russians in 1945 in honour of Baratashvili.

Above: Baratashvili Street, Tbilisi, Georgia

The Street is also associated with the old konka, Tbilisi’s horse-drawn tram system.

A decorative old tram carriage can be found nearby, recalling the city’s transport history.

The street is therefore not simply a ceremonial avenue bearing a poet’s name.

It is part of the everyday urban fabric of the capital.

Above: Tbilisi, Georgia

The bronze monument dedicated to the memory of Baratashvili was erected in 1976.

It stands in the small public space known as Baratashvili Square, near the bridge, on the left bank of the Mtkvari, at the foot of Avlabari Hill.

The nearby Elene Akhvlediani Rise provides a distinctive backdrop of old Tbilisi houses climbing the hillside.

The monument was erected more than a century after the poet’s death, and its date is worth noting.

Above: Baratashvili Monument, Tbilisi, Georgia

Baratashvili died in Ganja, Azerbaijan in 1845.

Baratashvili’s remains were returned to Tbilisi in 1893.

His monument followed in 1976.

His name now belongs to the city’s geography:

People cross his bridge, walk along his street and meet him in his square.

But I would distinguish between two kinds of recognition:

  • The city commemorates the poet through monuments, names and public spaces.
  • The reader encounters the individual through his words.

The first tells us that Georgia remembers Baratashvili.

The second gives us an opportunity to discover why he deserves to be remembered.

His poetry was published and increasingly celebrated in the decades that followed.

The 1976 monument belongs to a much later period of public commemoration.

The monument is a physical expression of the recognition that had eluded him during his lifetime.

Above: Baratashvili Monument, Tbilisi, Georgia

Nikoloz Baratashvili, affectionately known as Tato, was born in Tiflis (Tbilisi), Georgia’s capital, which was then the principal city of Russian Transcaucasia.

Above: Modern Tbilisi

His father, Prince Meliton Baratashvili (1795 – 1860), was an impoverished nobleman working for the Russian administration.

Above: Flag of the Russian Empire (1721 – 1917)

His mother, Ephemia Orbeliani (1801 – 1849), was a sister of the Georgian poet and general Prince Grigol Orbeliani and a scion of the penultimate Georgian King Erekle II.

Above: Georgian writer/general Prince Grigol Orbeliani (1804 – 1883)

Nikoloz was born in 1817, sixteen years after Russia annexed the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti.

He never knew an independent Georgian kingdom.

He knew a Georgia whose monarchy had been abolished, whose political institutions had been absorbed into the Russian Empire and whose aristocracy was adapting to a new order.

But independence was not some distant, abstract historical concept.

His family and social circle belonged to a generation that remembered the old kingdom, or had grown up listening to people who did.

The destruction of Tbilisi in 1795, the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783, and the subsequent annexation were part of the living historical memory of Georgian society.

Above: Capture of Tiflis by Agha Muhammad Shah (1795)

The Georgian Encyclopedia describes the national situation as the greatest source of spiritual pain in Baratashvili’s worldview.

It also identifies The Fate of Georgia as a work in which the historical events acquire a symbolic dimension.

That is important.

Above: Encyclopedia Georgia

Baratashvili was not simply writing a history lesson about a king who had lived before his birth.

He was writing about a decision whose consequences were still being lived.

“But who gave you, O Sire, the right to donate the lives of your subjects to follow the desire of your heart riding roughshod over freedom?“

Above: Georgian King Erekle II (1720 – 1798)

By the time of Baratashvili’s birth, Georgia had lost its political independence, but Georgian identity did not disappear with the monarchy.

The language remained.

Literature remained.

Memory remained.

People continued to write, teach, read and communicate in Georgian.

This is an important distinction:

Political sovereignty and cultural identity are not the same thing.

A nation can lose the first without surrendering the second.

Above: Flag of Georgia

In 1835, Baratashvili graduated from a Tiflis gymnasium (high school) for nobility, where he was tutored by Solomon Dodashvili, a Georgian patriot and liberal philosopher.

Above: Tbilisi Classical Gymnasium

Above: Georgian philosopher Solomon Dodashvili (1805 – 1836)

One account places Baratashvili’s staircase fall in 1832 and says he broke both legs, although only one remained impaired.

In December 1832, Dodashvili was arrested as one of the ideological leaders of a political conspiracy against the Tsarist regime.

In 1834, Dodashvili was sentenced to permanent exile to the northern province of Russia, Vyatka, where he went with his wife and children.

Above: Kirov (formerly Vyatka), Russia

Solomon Dodashvili was removed from Baratashvili’s world, but the intellectual influence of his teaching remained.

Above: Solomon Dodashvili Monument, Siighnaghi, Kakheti, Georgia

To understand 1832, we need to go back to the beginning of the century.

The Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti had entered into the Treaty of Georgievsk with Russia in 1783, seeking Russian protection while retaining its own monarchy and institutions.

Above: Georgian version of the Treaty of Georgievsk

In 1801, Russia unilaterally abolished the Kingdom and incorporated its territory into the Empire.

The royal family was removed from power.

Members of the Bagrationi dynasty were taken away from Georgia.

This was not merely a change of government.

Above: Coat of arms of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (1762 – 1801)

It meant the disappearance of Georgian statehood, the loss of political influence for the aristocracy, and the subordination of the Georgian Orthodox Church to the Russian ecclesiastical administration.

Above: Svetitskhoveli, the nation’s premier patriarchal cathedral and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, in Mtskheta, Georgia

Resentment was not confined to the nobility, although the 1832 conspiracy was principally an aristocratic and intellectual undertaking.

By the 1820s, a generation of Georgian nobles and intellectuals had begun to consider how independence might be restored.

One important figure was Prince Okropir Bagrationi, son of the last king of Kartli-Kakheti, George XII.

He had been living in Russia and helped inspire Georgian students there with the idea of restoring their country’s independence.

When he visited Georgia in 1830, he helped connect these ideas with a secret circle in Tbilisi.

The movement included members of the Orbeliani and Eristavi families, the philosopher and educator Solomon Dodashvili, and other representatives of the Georgian aristocracy and intelligentsia

The conspirators were not simply discussing independence in drawing rooms.

They developed an actual plan for an insurrection.

Above: Prince Okropir of Georgia (1795 – 1857)

The central proposal was audacious:

Russian military and administrative leaders would be invited to a grand ball in Tbilisi, hosted at the house of Prince Luarsab Orbeliani.

Above: 19th century Tiflis, Georgia

At a predetermined signal, the conspirators would arrest or kill the Russian officials attending.

Georgian forces would seize military installations and disarm Russian troops in and around Tbilisi.

The Darial Pass would be secured to prevent Russian reinforcements entering from the north.

Above: Darial Gorge, Georgia – Russia border

A member of the Bagrationi dynasty, Prince Alexander, would be brought back from Persia and proclaimed king.

The intention was to restore Georgian statehood under its former royal dynasty.

It is worth noting that the conspirators were not all pursuing the same political ideal.

Some envisaged restoring the monarchy.

Others entertained more constitutional or reformist ideas.

It would be misleading to describe the entire group as a modern democratic independence movement.

The planned date for the ball and uprising changed several times.

It was initially scheduled for November 1832, then postponed to December.

Above: Coat of arms of the Kingdom of Georgia

The conspiracy was betrayed before the plan could be executed.

One of the conspirators, Prince Iase Palavandishvili, was asked to recruit his brother, Nikolai Palavandishvili, who held an important administrative position in Tbilisi.

Nikolai reacted by demanding that his brother disclose the conspiracy to the authorities.

He apparently threatened suicide if Iase refused.

Iase eventually gave in.

On 9 December 1832, he informed the authorities, and the conspiracy was exposed.

The Russian authorities arrested numerous suspected participants.

There was no battle, no storming of the fortress, no triumphant counter-revolution.

The planned uprising simply never happened.

The conspirators were defeated before they had the opportunity to discover whether their plan would actually work.

There was no single moment when all the conspirators collectively acknowledged defeat and reconciled themselves to Russian rule.

Instead, there was a process:

December 1832:

Arrests began, followed by interrogations.

1833–1834:

The investigation and judicial proceedings exposed the extent of the conspiracy.

Some leading figures received severe sentences.

Following years:

Some conspirators were sent into exile or assigned to military service far from Georgia.

Others eventually received permission to return.

Later careers:

Some former conspirators entered or continued careers within the Russian imperial system.

Ten defendants were initially sentenced to death, but the sentences were commuted.

Above: Coat of arms of the Russian Empire

The consequences were therefore uneven.

Some men were permanently separated from their homeland.

Others returned and served in the imperial administration or military.

The failure nevertheless produced a profound crisis in Georgian political and intellectual life.

The possibility of restoring independence through an aristocratic conspiracy had been badly damaged.

The next major phase of Georgian national revival would take a different form, developing through literature, education, journalism and cultural activity in the following decades.

Above: Coat of arms of Georgia

I do not imagine that 15-year-old Nikoloz witnessed his teacher’s arrest.

Not the arrest itself.

Not a dramatic confrontation with soldiers.

Not a farewell.

A schoolroom.

A lesson.

A teacher who is no longer there.

At first, perhaps the absence is unexplained.

Then the news circulates.

The teacher has been arrested.

The intellectual world in which the boy has been learning suddenly feels less secure.

I cannot claim that this is how Nikoloz actually experienced the events.

I imagine Nikoloz returning to the classroom and finding that his teacher was no longer there.

We cannot say that this happened exactly as imagined, or that the absence immediately inspired a poem.

But the consequences of the conspiracy were not confined to those arrested.

The young people around them had to live with the aftermath.

The Georgian Encyclopedia describes a period of profound spiritual depression following the failed conspiracy, while noting that Baratashvili and other young writers continued to participate in cultural and social life.

There is a distinction worth exploring:

The conspiracy was an attempt to recover political independence through action.

The generation that followed it had to consider what remained possible when that action had failed.

Perhaps literature became one of the places where the question could continue to be asked.

Above: Alphabet Tower, Batumi, Adjara, Georgia

The tragic quality of Baratashvili’s poetry was determined by his traumatic personal life as well as the contemporary political situation in his homeland.

The failure of the 1832 anti-Russian conspiracy of Georgian nobles, with which Baratashvili sympathized as a schoolboy, forced many conspirators to see the independent past as irremediably lost and to reconcile themselves with the Russian autocracy, transforming their laments for the lost past and the fall of the native dynasty into Romantic poetry.

His uncle Grigol Orbeliani was caught up in the investigations and spent time in prison.

Their correspondence offers a counterpoint to the teacher’s absence.

One relationship has been interrupted by political events.

Another continues through letters.

Nikoloz can send poems, share his thoughts, seek approval, tease his uncle and express affection.

The letter becomes more than a means of communication.

It is a way of maintaining intellectual and emotional companionship across distance.

And perhaps this is where the Georgian language returns as something more than a national inheritance.

It is the language in which two people recognize one another.

Above: Georgian alphabet

Grigol was born into the Georgian aristocracy, with royal connections through his mother.

He was 13 years older than Nikoloz, old enough to be an uncle but young enough to be a companion to a growing nephew.

He was already a soldier in Russian service when the 1832 conspiracy took place.

He had been involved in the opposition movement, although the extent of his participation is important to qualify.

Above: Grigol Orbeliani

Orbeliani was arrested in Novgorod in March 1833, after a Georgian translation of Kondraty Ryleev’s Nalivaiko’s Confession was found among his belongings.

The investigation did not establish that he had actively participated in the planned coup.

Above: Images of Veliky Novgorod, Russia

Orbeliani was imprisoned for three months and subsequently sent to serve in a regiment at Vilnius.

Above: Vilnius, Lithuania

There is an interesting detail here:

Ryleev was a Russian Decembrist poet executed after the failed uprising of 1825.

Grigol’s translation of his work suggests that Georgian resistance to imperial rule was connected to a wider literary and political world.

Poetry and political aspiration were not separate compartments.

Above: Russian writer / Decembrists leader Kondraty Ryleyev (1795 – 1826)

The Decembrist revolt was a failed coup d’état led by liberal military and political dissidents against the Russian Empire. It took place in Saint Petersburg on 26 December 1825, following the death of Emperor Alexander I. (1777 – 1825)

Above: Decembrists at Peter’s Square, St. Petersburg, Russia

But the most revealing evidence of Grigol’s influence on Nikoloz comes later, in their correspondence.

Baratashvili’s surviving letters describe a relationship that went well beyond family obligation.

Nikoloz sent Grigol his poems and sought his literary judgement.

He confided his happiness and disappointments, including his romantic attachments, and treated his uncle as someone with whom he could share his more troubled thoughts.

There is a lovely little indication of their intimacy:

In the earlier letters Nikoloz addresses him as Uncle, but later he calls him “my beloved brother Grigol“.

He also teases him about women and romantic entanglements.

This was not a distant, solemn relationship between an eminent aristocrat and a deferential nephew.

There was affection, humour and a degree of equality.

Grigol was himself a poet, a representative of Georgian Romanticism.

Nikoloz could therefore turn to him not only as a relative but as a fellow writer.

Above: “Mysterious Voice“, Nikoloz Baratashvili

The poem Merani, among others, was sent to him.

And here is the complication:

Grigol eventually resumed his military career and rose to very high positions in the Russian imperial system.

A man who had been associated with a movement to restore Georgian independence became a distinguished imperial officer.

That does not necessarily mean that his earlier patriotism was insincere.

It does, however, make him a fascinating figure in the story of a generation that had to find a way to live after the failure of its political hopes.

Above: Grigol Orbeliani

Dodashvili’s life was remarkable for someone who died at only 31.

He came from Magharo in Kakheti, studied in Tbilisi and then went to St Petersburg, where he attended the Faculty of Philosophy and Law.

He graduated in 1827.

His philosophical interests included German idealism, particularly Kant.

He could have pursued an academic career in Russia.

Instead, he returned to Georgia and became a teacher at the Noble School in Tbilisi, where Baratashvili was one of his favourite pupils.

He taught Georgian language, logic and geography.

He also wrote a textbook on Georgian grammar and worked as a journalist and editor.

In 1832 he began publishing a literary supplement to the newspaper Tfilisis Utskebani.

Only five issues appeared before the political crisis overtook him.

Consider what that meant for a young Georgian student.

Dodashvili was introducing pupils to disciplined reasoning and philosophical enquiry while also demonstrating that Georgian could be a language of serious intellectual and literary work.

He was helping to establish a Georgian intellectual culture at a time when the country’s political institutions were controlled by Russia.

His contribution was not simply to teach the young Nikoloz facts.

He represented a way of thinking:

That Georgia possessed an intellectual and cultural identity worth cultivating, independently of its political circumstances.

There is an important qualification, though.

We have evidence that Dodashvili was one of Baratashvili’s favourite teachers, but we cannot reconstruct the precise conversations they had or identify which particular poems resulted from which particular lessons.

Above: Solomon Dodashvili Monument, Sighnaghi

Dodashvili was one of the ideological leaders of the 1832 conspiracy.

He was arrested in December 1832.

In 1834, he was sentenced to permanent exile in Vyatka, in central Russia.

He went into exile with his wife and children.

He died there of tuberculosis on 1 September 1836, aged 31.

His remains were eventually returned to Georgia in 1994 and buried at Mtatsminda Pantheon.

Above: St. David’s Church and Mtatsminda Pantheon, Tbilisi, Georgia

Imagine the effect on a 15-year-old pupil.

A teacher he admired, a man who had returned from the imperial capital to educate Georgian children, was arrested and sent thousands of kilometres away.

He would never return alive.

We cannot say precisely how Nikoloz processed that loss.

But the event belonged to the formative world in which he became a poet.

There is something especially poignant about the fact that Dodashvili, died the same year he completed his schooling.

The contrast is striking:

One generation’s hopes had ended in arrest and exile.

A younger generation was beginning to find another means of expressing its aspirations.

Above: Mtatsminda Pantheon, Tbilisi, Georgia

The failure of a political conspiracy did not end the Georgian struggle for identity.

Some of its unfinished hopes found expression in poetry.

Shortage of money prevented Baratashvili from continuing his studies in Russian universities while an early physical injury did not allow him to enter military service as he wished.

He wanted a military career but was unable to pursue it.

Around him, men were attempting to change Georgia’s political destiny through conspiracy, while he faced a physical limitation that restricted his own ambitions.

Both the individual and the country faced constraints that they had not chosen.

Eventually, Baratashvili had to enter the Russian bureaucratic service and serve as an ordinary clerk in the Azerbaijani town of Ganja.

Above: Images of Ganja, Azerbaijan

The love of his life, Princess Ekaterine Chavchavadze, rejected him.

The familiar story is that Baratashvili loved Ekaterine Chavchavadze, but she married David Dadiani, Prince of Mingrelia in 1839.

Above: Ekateriné Dadiani, Princess of Mingrelia (née Chavchavadze) (1816 – 1882)

Above: Prince David Dadiani of Mingrelia (1813 – 1853)

However, the relationship may be more interesting than the simple story of rejection suggests.

The National Parliamentary Library’s biographical account says Ekaterine retained tender feelings for Baratashvili, preserved a notebook of his poems, and later showed it to Ilia Chavchavadze.

Above: National Library of Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia

That notebook helped bring his work to wider recognition.

We should not presume that she returned his romantic feelings, but neither should we portray her as indifferent or cruel.

There is a poignant irony here:

A woman who did not become his wife helped preserve his literary legacy.

Above: Ekateriné Chavchavadze

How does a person preserve an inner freedom when the world around him denies or restricts his outward freedom?

Baratashvili’s creative career is generally dated from 1833 to 1845.

His first artistically complete poem, Twilight Over Mtatsminda, belongs to the period 1833–1836.

His Meditations by the River Mtkvari, written in 1837, already reveals a young man wrestling with the meaning of existence, the world and the limitations of human fulfilment.

So The Fate of Georgia did not emerge from nowhere.

By 1839, he had been writing for several years.

He was developing a poetic language and a way of examining questions that were at once personal, philosophical and national.

Above: Nikoloz Baratashvili

There is another detail I find particularly useful.

A recent scholarly study of the poem describes the gatherings at the home of Dimitri Kipiani, where young intellectuals met, read their poems, received comments and presented revised versions.

Baratashvili was a frequent visitor.

Above: Georgian writer Dimitri Kipiani (1814 – 1887)

This gives us a possible setting for his development:

Not an isolated young genius suddenly producing a national epic, but a young poet working within a circle of educated Georgians who were discussing literature, history and the future of their country.

In 1839, Baratashvili was 22.

He chose to set his poem around the decision made by Erekle II to seek Russian protection.

Why that question?

Because it was still being debated among Georgian intellectuals.

Had Erekle made the right decision?

Had he chosen the lesser evil in a desperate situation?

Had the protection of a powerful Christian neighbour preserved Georgia, or had it opened the way to the loss of its independence?

Baratashvili does not clearly take either side in the debate.

That restraint matters.

He could have written a denunciation of Russia.

He could have celebrated Erekle’s decision as necessary.

Instead, he dramatized the dilemma through the opposing voices of the King and Solomon Lionidze.

Perhaps the young poet was less interested in delivering a verdict than in understanding how a country could arrive at such a terrible choice.

The Fate of Georgia (Bedi Kartlisa) is a relatively short narrative poem, not a book-length epic.

It consists of approximately 1,000 lines of verse.

A key insight into the worldview of Baratashvili can be found in this historical poem, an inspiring and articulate lament for Georgia’s latest misfortunates.

This poem is based on a real historical event:

By the 18th century, Georgia was no longer the powerful, unified medieval kingdom it had once been.

The country had fragmented into several kingdoms and principalities.

Eastern Georgia, comprising Kartli and Kakheti, was ruled by Erekle II, who succeeded in uniting the two kingdoms in 1762.

But his position was precarious.

Above: Palace of King Erekle II, Telavi, Kakheti, Georgia

Three major threats confronted him:

Persia (Iran):

Successive Persian rulers regarded eastern Georgia as part of their traditional sphere of influence.

Erekle had to contend with Persian demands for submission.

Above: Flag of modern Iran

The Ottoman Empire:

Ottoman influence and military pressure were particularly significant in western and south-western Georgia.

Above: Flag of the Ottoman Empire (1299 – 1922)

Dagestani raiders:

Incursions from the North Caucasus caused repeated devastation, including the capture of people who were sold into slavery.

Above: Flag of Dagestan

Erekle needed military assistance, but also a diplomatic arrangement that would discourage his neighbours from attacking.

The destruction of Tbilisi in 1795 by the Persian ruler Mohammad Khan Qajar, which forced the disappointed Georgian King Erekle II to entrust his country’s security to the Russian Empire.

However, national problems considered in this work are viewed with a modern approach.

The poem considers not only Georgia’s past, but also its future in the aftermath of the failed revolt of 1832.

Above: Agha Mohammad Khan (1742 – 1797)

Why Russia?

Russia offered several attractions.

First, it was an expanding imperial power with the military resources to offer protection.

Above: Russian Empire

Second, it was an Orthodox Christian monarchy.

Religious affinity mattered:

Erekle could present an alliance with Russia as a relationship between Christian rulers rather than submission to a Muslim power.

Above: Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, Russia

Third, Russia was geographically accessible through the Caucasus, although the mountain route made military assistance difficult.

Above: The Caucasus region

And finally, Erekle had ambitions beyond mere survival.

He hoped Russian assistance would strengthen his kingdom, protect the Bagrationi dynasty and perhaps enable him to recover territories that had been lost.

He formally requested Russian protection in December 1782.

The resulting Treaty of Georgievsk was signed on 4 August 1783.

Above: 1983 Soviet stamp commemorating the 200-years anniversary of the treaty and celebrating it as “the first manifesto of the friendship and brotherhood between the Russian and Georgian peoples“

The Treaty was a protectorate agreement, not an immediate annexation.

In broad terms:

Russia undertook to:

  • Protect Kartli-Kakheti against external enemies.
  • Preserve the territorial integrity of the kingdom.
  • Recognise the Bagrationi dynasty and the hereditary succession.
  • Provide military assistance.

Erekle undertook to:

  • Conduct his foreign relations in accordance with Russian interests.
  • Avoid independent diplomatic agreements with other powers.
  • Acknowledge the Russian emperor’s authority as protector.

In other words, Erekle surrendered considerable freedom in foreign policy in exchange for security guarantees and the preservation of his Kingdom’s internal government.

The two parties, however, had different expectations.

Erekle wanted protection.

Russia wanted influence and a strategic foothold south of the Caucasus.

Above: Russia–Georgia Friendship Monument, Devils Valley, Georgia

The arrangement was tested in September 1795.

Agha Mohammad Khan, founder of the Qajar dynasty, demanded Erekle’s submission.

Erekle refused, relying in part on his alliance with Russia.

The Persian army invaded.

At the Battle of Krtsanisi, near Tbilisi, Erekle’s forces were overwhelmed.

The capital was captured and devastated.

Many inhabitants were killed or carried away into captivity.

Russia did not provide the promised military protection.

The precise reasons involve Russian strategic priorities and the withdrawal of troops during the preceding Russo-Ottoman conflict, but the outcome was devastating:

Kartli-Kakheti had antagonized Persia through its Russian alignment without receiving the protection it had expected.

Erekle died in 1798.

Above. Battle of Krtsanisi, 8 – 11 September 1795

His son Giorgi XII inherited a weakened kingdom and again appealed to Russia for assistance.

Above: Georgian King George XII (1746 – 1800)

In 1801, following Giorgi’s death, Tsar Paul I proclaimed the annexation of Kartli-Kakheti.

Russia did not preserve the Bagrationi monarchy as the treaty had promised.

The protectorate had become annexation.

Above. Russian Emperor Paul I (1754 – 1801)

In this poem, Baratashvili depicts the debate of Erekle II with his chancellor, Solomon Lionidze, who opposes the union with Russia and thinks that this will result in the loss of Georgia’s national identity.

Erekle argues, in effect, that Georgia needs protection.

Its survival as a political entity is at stake.

Russia offers the most practical means of securing it.

Lionidze fears that accepting Russian protection will cost Georgia something more fundamental:

Its independence, identity and freedom to determine its own future.

Lionidze’s wife asks her husband, in a lament that became familiar to all literate Georgians:

“What pleasure does the tender nightingale receive from honor if it is in a cage?”

The sympathies of the poet and reader both fall on Solomon’s side, but the objectively rational decision of the King prevails.

The King may have made a rational decision.

But does a rational decision necessarily make it a happy one?

Above: Georgian Chancellor Solomon Lionidze

The question posed by Lionidze’s wife — What pleasure can a tender nightingale take in honour when it is confined to a cage? — is not merely a pretty poetic image.

Above: Nightingale

It challenges the very idea that security, status or protection can compensate for the loss of freedom.

There is a political question here, certainly.

But there is also a human one.

A young man who had never known an independent Georgia set out to write about the decision that had cost it its independence.

He did not write a history of the Kingdom, nor a simple lament for its passing.

He gave its past a conversation — and allowed two men to argue over its future.

What made Baratashvili put pen to paper?

Above: Portrayal of Nikoloz Baratashvili

My interpretation — and I stress that this is an interpretation — is that several things converged:

He belonged to a family and social circle in which the memory of Georgian independence remained alive.

He had witnessed the consequences of the failed 1832 conspiracy through people close to him.

He was developing as a poet within a generation of Georgian intellectuals trying to find a cultural response to political subordination.

He was confronted with a question that had no comfortable answer:

Could a small country preserve its existence by surrendering its freedom?

I find myself looking at more recent history.

Did the powers that be in South Ossetia and Abkhazia seek help from the Russians before Russians swept in to seize their territory?

The historical parallel is worth examining.

The separatist authorities in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia sought Russian support, and in South Ossetia they appealed to Moscow remarkably early.

But the sequence is more complicated than simply inviting Russia in and then having their territory seized.

There are also important differences between the two regions.

The crisis began before the Soviet Union had even dissolved.

Above: Flag of the Soviet Union (1922 – 1991)

In November 1989, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast sought elevation to the status of an autonomous republic within Georgia.

Above: Georgian Soviet Republic (1957 -1991)

Georgian nationalists, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, opposed this.

Above: Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939 – 1993)

On 11 December 1990, the Georgian Supreme Soviet abolished South Ossetia’s autonomous status.

Above: Flag of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (1921 – 1991)

The South Ossetian authorities responded by declaring that the region should be placed directly under Soviet jurisdiction and appealed to Moscow for assistance.

That is a particularly important detail:

They were appealing to the Soviet Union, not yet to the Russian Federation as an independent state.

Above: Flag of South Ossetia

Armed conflict followed between Georgian forces and South Ossetian militias.

The fighting continued into 1992.

Above: Map of South Ossetia (1992 – 2008)

In June 1992, Russia brokered the Sochi ceasefire agreement.

Above: Sochi, Russia

Russian, Georgian and Ossetian forces participated in the subsequent peacekeeping arrangements.

The agreement effectively left South Ossetia outside Tbilisi’s control, although it remained internationally recognised as Georgian territory.

The separatist leadership’s relationship with Moscow subsequently deepened.

By 2002, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity was openly seeking eventual incorporation into Russia.

Above: South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity (r. 2001 – 2011)

The sequence in Abkhazia was somewhat different.

In July 1992, the Abkhaz legislature reinstated the 1925 Constitution, which it interpreted as establishing Abkhazia’s sovereign status.

This was effectively a declaration of independence.

In August, Georgian National Guard forces entered Abkhazia, initially ostensibly to secure railway communications and infrastructure.

The operation developed into a much wider military confrontation.

The Abkhaz leadership sought and received substantial support from Russia and volunteers from the North Caucasus.

Russia’s role during this first war was complicated.

Different Russian military and political actors supported different sides at different times.

Nevertheless, Russian military resources, weapons and personnel played a significant part in the Abkhaz victory in 1993.

The consequences were catastrophic.

Georgian forces were expelled, Sukhumi fell in September 1993, and more than 200,000 ethnic Georgians were displaced from Abkhazia.

In 1994, Russian-led CIS peacekeepers were deployed.

Russia was now simultaneously a major participant in the conflict’s history and a central actor in its supposed resolution.

Above: Flag of Abkhazia

By 2008, Russia had developed an extraordinarily close relationship with the separatist administrations.

It had:

  • Distributed Russian passports extensively among the populations.
  • Provided economic and political support.
  • Maintained military and security relationships.
  • Established direct official links with the separatist authorities.

In April 2008, Vladimir Putin instructed Russian authorities to establish direct official and legal relations with the de facto administrations in both regions.

Above: Russian leader Vladimir Putin

Georgia protested that this was effectively an attempt at annexation.

When full-scale war broke out in August, Russia justified its military intervention in part by claiming that it was protecting Russian citizens and peacekeepers in South Ossetia.

The South Ossetian authorities also appealed to Russia for military assistance.

Above: Coat of arms of South Ossetia

Abkhaz forces, meanwhile, opened another front against Georgian positions in the Kodori Gorge.

The European Union’s independent investigation into the war is useful here because it does not simply accept either government’s account.

Above: Flag of the European Union

It examines the escalation, the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, the Russian response and the subsequent expansion of Russian military operations.

Above: Tskhinval, South Ossetia

On 26 August 2008, Russia recognised both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.

It did not formally incorporate them into the Russian Federation, although South Ossetia’s leadership has repeatedly expressed a desire for eventual union with Russia.

Russia maintains military forces in both territories and exercises decisive influence over their security and political circumstances.

Above: Banner of the Russian Armed Forces

The overwhelming majority of the international community continues to recognize both territories as part of Georgia.

Above: Flag of the United Nations

The Swedish Institute of International Affairs has published a useful recent historical assessment of Russia’s role in these conflicts.

It argues that Moscow has systematically used the regions to retain influence over Georgia and constrain its foreign policy choices.

There is a fundamental difference:

Erekle was the recognized king of a sovereign Georgian kingdom seeking protection for his state.

The South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities were separatist administrations seeking to detach territories from an internationally recognised sovereign state.

But there is also a recurring question:

When a smaller political entity appeals to a powerful neighbour for protection, who ultimately determines the terms of that protection?

Erekle II discovered that Russia’s strategic interests did not necessarily coincide with his own.

The separatist administrations have likewise become heavily dependent on Moscow.

The 1832 conspirators were responding to a historical betrayal that had occurred within living memory of their families:

Georgia had sought protection, Russia had promised to preserve its monarchy, and Russia had eventually abolished it.

For Baratashvili, this was not ancient history.

It was the political inheritance of his generation.

The fate of Georgia was not simply imposed by foreign conquest.

It was also shaped by the desperate choices made by Georgians seeking to preserve their country.

Why was remaining in Georgia such an anathema for South Ossetia and Abkhazia?

In August 1989, as Georgia moved towards independence, its Supreme Soviet adopted a law establishing Georgian as the official language throughout the republic.

For Georgians, this was understandable.

Their language had been subordinated to Russian during the Soviet period, and restoring its public status was an important element of national revival.

Above: Georgia (Kartuli) written in the Georgian language

But consider how the same measure might have appeared in Sukhumi or Tskhinvali.

Above: Images of Sukhumi, Abkhazia

A person working in a government office might increasingly need Georgian.

Those educated primarily in Russian or their own minority language could find their professional opportunities restricted.

Above: Russian alphabet

Georgian could become the language of administration and public advancement, even in areas where many residents did not speak it.

The law therefore raised legitimate concerns about access and equality.

However, it is important not to overstate its provisions:

The subsequent State Language Programme did not abolish minority-language education or prohibit the use of Abkhazian and Ossetian.

It also envisaged maintaining non-Georgian schools.

In other words, there was a real language dispute, but also considerable political anxiety surrounding it.

Abkhazia’s circumstances were particularly complicated.

Under Soviet rule, Abkhazia had enjoyed the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Georgian SSR.

The Abkhaz were not, however, the largest ethnic group in their own autonomous republic.

The Abkhaz feared that political democratisation and the emergence of an independent Georgian state would put their cultural and political position at risk.

Their concerns had a longer history:

They believed that Abkhazia’s earlier political status had been progressively reduced under Soviet rule.

They objected to the growing Georgian demographic presence.

They complained about inadequate opportunities for Abkhaz-language education and higher education.

They feared that a Georgian national government would favour the Georgian majority.

In 1978, Abkhaz intellectuals petitioned Moscow to separate Abkhazia from Georgia and attach it directly to Russia.

Moscow rejected the request but introduced concessions, including increased Abkhaz representation in local administration and the establishment of Abkhaz-language educational and broadcasting institutions.

That episode demonstrates that Abkhaz dissatisfaction with their position within Georgia predated the Georgian independence movement by more than a decade.

In March 1989, around 30,000 people gathered at Lykhny to demand restoration of Abkhazia’s earlier status.

Above: Lykhny, Abkhazia (1989)

The Abkhaz leadership was not initially demanding simply to become an independent country.

It wanted a different constitutional relationship with Moscow, one that would remove its subordination to Tbilisi.

Above: Coat of arms of Abkhazia

South Ossetia had a different constitutional position.

It was an Autonomous Oblast, a lower level of autonomy than Abkhazia’s Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Ossetians also had a particular geographical and cultural connection to North Ossetia, which was part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

Consequently, some South Ossetian political figures wanted:

  • Promotion from autonomous oblast to autonomous republic.
  • Greater protection for Ossetian language and culture.
  • Closer political ties with North Ossetia.
  • Eventually, unification with North Ossetia within the Soviet Union.

The language issue was particularly sensitive because Russian, rather than Georgian, was widely used for administration and communication in South Ossetia.

Many Ossetians regarded the new Georgian language requirements as a threat to their existing professional and educational opportunities.

Above: Sample of Ossetian language

But there was another historical grievance.

The violent conflict between Georgian Menshevik forces and Ossetian Bolsheviks in 1918 – 1921 remained part of the political memory of the region.

(The Mensheviks were a faction of the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) which split with Vladimir Lenin’s Bolshevik faction at the Second Party Congress in 1903.)

(The Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, were a radical faction of the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) which split with the Mensheviks at the Second Party Congress in 1903.) 

Above: Vladimir Lenin (1870 – 1924)

That history was revived during the late-1980s nationalist mobilization.

Above: The Bolshevik (1920), Boris Kustodiev

I would be reluctant to frame this as a simple choice between Georgian oppression and Russian protection.

There were genuine grievances among Abkhazians and South Ossetians.

There were also genuine fears among Georgians that their country was being divided and that Moscow was encouraging separatism to undermine Georgian independence.

Both sets of fears could coexist.

There is evidence that many ethnic Abkhazians would prefer genuine independence from both Georgia and Russia.

South Ossetia, by contrast, has a much stronger political and popular orientation towards Russia, although that does not necessarily mean that everyone wants formal incorporation into the Russian Federation.

And there is a third distinction:

What people want, what their political leaders say they want, and what their circumstances allow them to achieve are not necessarily the same thing.

We should also be cautious about speaking of either population as though it has one collective opinion.

Reliable independent polling in these territories is difficult.

The available surveys are not equally recent or representative.

For many ethnic Abkhazians, independence is not simply a stepping stone towards joining Russia.

It is the very objective for which they believe their community fought during the 1992 – 1993 war.

A study published in 2023, drawing on earlier survey research, reported that 79% of ethnic Abkhaz respondents preferred independence, rather than integration with Russia or Georgia.

The same research found substantial differences among ethnic communities:

Armenians and Russians in Abkhazia were more inclined towards integration with Russia.

These are older figures, not a measurement of opinion today, but they illustrate why it is important to distinguish ethnic Abkhaz opinion from the views of the entire population.

The distinction became very visible in November 2024.

Abkhaz protesters occupied government buildings in Sukhumi and forced President Aslan Bzhania to resign.

Above: Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania (r. 2020 – 2024)

The immediate trigger was an investment agreement with Russia that opponents feared would give Russian businesses excessive influence over property and the local economy.

This was not a demonstration in favour of joining Georgia.

It was, in significant part, a demonstration against what protesters regarded as an erosion of Abkhaz autonomy by Russia.

There is a revealing contradiction here:

Russia is regarded by many as the guarantor of Abkhazia’s security, yet the prospect of becoming too dependent on Russia also provokes resistance.

Above: RUB 5,000 (Russian ruble banknote)

A sociological survey conducted in June 2025 by researchers at Abkhaz State University and Moscow State University interviewed 600 people across Abkhazia.

It found:

  • 51.8% were satisfied to some degree with the situation in the republic.
  • 35.6% were dissatisfied.
  • Low wages, drug addiction and corruption were among the leading concerns.
  • 53.8% wanted greater openness from their government, particularly about development plans.

This was a survey of domestic conditions, not a referendum on Abkhazia’s international status.

Nevertheless, it suggests that everyday concerns are increasingly important alongside questions of sovereignty.

Above: Abkhazia State University, Sukhumi, Abkhazia

More recently, interviews conducted by OC Media in 2026 illustrated the range of views.

Some residents expressed a desire for closer integration with Russia, while others wanted independence from Russian interference.

One resident even expressed a preference for reconciliation with Georgia, provided Russia was not involved.

That last sentiment is particularly interesting.

It demonstrates that reconciliation with Georgia is not necessarily inconceivable to every Abkhazian, although it is not the prevailing political position.

South Ossetia is different.

Its political leadership has repeatedly expressed interest in eventual unification with North Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation.

This would effectively mean incorporation into Russia.

There are several reasons:

The Ossetian population is divided between North and South Ossetia.

There are strong linguistic, cultural and family connections across the Caucasus Mountains.

Russia provides security, financial support and employment opportunities.

The 2008 war and its aftermath have left deep distrust of Georgia.

The territory is now almost entirely dependent on Moscow.

Freedom House’s 2026 assessment describes Russian influence over its politics and governance as decisive.

However, there is an interesting qualification.

In December 2025, South Ossetian Foreign Minister Akhsar Dzhioev said that accession to Russia remained a matter for bilateral discussion, while emphasising that Russia continued to recognize South Ossetia as an independent state.

So even the official position is not simply that incorporation has already been decided.

Above: South Ossetian Foreign Minister Akhsar Dzhioev

Many Abkhazians fought to escape Georgian political control.

Yet they also resist the prospect of losing their autonomy to Russia.

They want their own country, but the international circumstances make that extraordinarily difficult.

In a sense, they have achieved de facto separation from Georgia without achieving the international independence they sought.

South Ossetia has followed a different trajectory, becoming much more closely integrated with Russia.

And perhaps the most important distinction is this:

Not wanting to belong to Georgia does not automatically mean wanting to belong to Russia.

That is a distinction worth keeping in mind whenever we discuss the Caucasus.

It is also a reminder that national identity, political allegiance and the desire for self-determination do not always point in the same direction.

This is the question underneath much of our discussion:

How does a small nation or community preserve its freedom without becoming dependent on a more powerful neighbour?

The Georgian independence movement was not uniformly hostile to minorities.

Nevertheless, some of its most influential voices used language that understandably alarmed non-Georgians.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who became Georgia’s first elected president, promoted a strongly national conception of Georgian statehood.

The slogan commonly associated with this period, Georgia for Georgians, became emblematic of the anxieties of minority communities.

There were also political disagreements over the very existence of autonomous territories.

Some Georgian nationalists regarded the Soviet-era autonomies as instruments of Moscow’s divide-and-rule policy, rather than legitimate expressions of local self-government.

For Abkhazians and South Ossetians, that raised an alarming possibility:

Georgia might achieve independence from Russia by weakening or abolishing the autonomy that protected their communities.

The tensions were not merely theoretical.

In November 1989, a large Georgian demonstration travelled to Tskhinvali in opposition to South Ossetian demands for increased autonomy.

Clashes followed.

In July 1989, violence had already broken out in Sukhumi over plans to establish a branch of Tbilisi State University there.

It is important, though, not to treat all Georgians, Abkhazians or Ossetians as having held identical views.

There were moderates and advocates of coexistence in all three communities.

For significant sections of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian political leadership, remaining within an independent Georgian state under the emerging nationalist leadership seemed more dangerous than maintaining a relationship with Moscow.

Let us return to Persia and Turkey and Russia.

Why the interest in Georgia?

Georgia occupied a strategic crossroads between Europe and Asia, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and between three competing imperial systems: Persian, Ottoman and Russian.

Each power had different reasons for wanting influence there.

For Persia and the Ottoman Empire, Georgia was part of an established contest for regional supremacy.

For Russia, it represented both an opportunity to expand southwards and a means of controlling access to the wider Caucasus.

Let’s look at the geography first, because it explains much of the politics.

Georgia sits on the southern side of the Greater Caucasus mountain range.

To its west is the Black Sea.

To its east, beyond Azerbaijan, lies the Caspian Sea.

To its south are Armenia, eastern Anatolia and Iran.

This made the region valuable for several reasons:

Military access:

Control of the Caucasus provided routes for armies moving between the northern and southern sides of the mountain range.

Trade:

The region connected Black Sea ports, Persia, the Caspian basin and routes towards Central Asia.

Strategic depth:

Whoever controlled Georgia could establish a military and political presence in the South Caucasus.

Influence over neighbours:

Georgia’s position affected the security and ambitions of Persia, the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

It wasn’t simply Georgia’s territory that mattered.

It was what controlling Georgia made possible elsewhere.

Persia’s interest was the oldest and most deeply rooted of the three.

For centuries, eastern Georgia had been within the political and cultural orbit of successive Persian empires.

The Safavid rulers, particularly Shah Abbas I (1587 – 1629), sought to maintain control over Georgia and prevent the Ottomans from gaining an advantage there.

Persian interests included:

  • Maintaining influence over the Georgian kings and nobility.
  • Controlling the approaches to Azerbaijan and the northern Persian provinces.
  • Preventing Ottoman expansion eastwards.
  • Obtaining soldiers, administrators and political allies from Georgia.

There was also a significant human dimension.

Georgian nobles and soldiers became influential in Persian military and administrative life.

Some rose to positions of considerable power at the Safavid court.

By the 18th century, however, Persia was weakened by internal instability.

The rise of the Qajar dynasty under Agha Mohammad Khan brought a renewed determination to recover territories formerly under Persian authority.

His attack on Tbilisi in 1795 was not simply an act of retaliation against Erekle II.

It was an attempt to reassert Persian supremacy in the Caucasus and punish a Georgian ruler who had aligned himself with Russia.

Above: Map of Iran under the Qajar dynasty in the 19th century

The Ottoman Empire’s interest was principally western and south-western Georgia, although it repeatedly sought influence over the whole country.

The Ottomans wanted to:

  • Secure their eastern frontier in Anatolia.
  • Prevent Persian expansion towards the Black Sea.
  • Control strategically important routes and fortifications.
  • Extend their influence over the Georgian kingdoms and principalities.
  • Maintain access to the Black Sea and its eastern coastline.

The rivalry with Persia became particularly intense during the 16th century.

Above: Map of the Ottoman Empire

The Treaty of Amasya in 1555 established a rough division of influence: eastern Georgian territories, including Kartli and Kakheti, fell within the Persian sphere, while Imereti and western Samtskhe came under Ottoman influence.

That arrangement was not permanent.

The two empires continued fighting over the region.

In 1590, Persia temporarily recognised Ottoman claims over all Georgia.

For the Ottomans, Georgia was therefore both a frontier and a potential avenue for expansion.

Above: The reception of the Safavid envoy Farrukhzād Beg to Suleiman the Magnificent during the Treaty of Amasya

Russia’s ambitions developed later, but eventually transformed the balance of power.

Under Peter the Great (1682 – 1725), Russia began looking southwards with renewed determination.

Peter’s Caspian campaign of 1722 – 1723 was motivated by commercial opportunities and territorial ambitions, but also by the desire to prevent the Ottoman Empire from exploiting Persia’s weakness.

His primary strategic objective was to block Ottoman expansion into the Caucasus.

Russia temporarily acquired Persian territories along the Caspian coast.

Above: Russian Emperor Peter I (1672 – 1725)

Under Catherine II, Russian ambitions became more systematic.

Georgia offered Russia:

  • A foothold south of the Greater Caucasus.
  • A potential route towards eastern Anatolia and the Ottoman Empire.
  • A means of containing Persian influence.
  • A strategic connection between the Black Sea and Caspian regions.
  • An opportunity to present itself as the protector of Orthodox Christians.

The last point was especially useful diplomatically.

Russia could portray its expansion as the defence of fellow Christians, while pursuing its own imperial interests.

The 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk was a significant step in that process.

It gave Russia a formal political relationship with eastern Georgia, and gave Russia an opportunity to establish a lasting presence south of the Caucasus.

Above: Russian Empress Catherine II (1729 – 1796)

Georgia was not merely a passive prize.

Its rulers repeatedly attempted to exploit the rivalry, seeking protection from one power against another.

Sometimes they succeeded temporarily.

Sometimes the consequences were disastrous.

Georgia’s location brought commercial and cultural opportunities, but it also exposed its people to repeated invasions, occupations, deportations and political interference.

The same geographical position that made Georgia valuable to the empires made independence difficult to maintain.

And that brings us back to Erekle II.

He was not foolish to seek Russian protection.

He was making a calculation in an extremely difficult strategic environment.

But he underestimated the extent to which Russia’s interests differed from his own.

Russia wanted a foothold.

Erekle wanted a protector.

The treaty brought the two objectives together temporarily, but they were never quite the same thing.

Perhaps that is the recurring tragedy of Georgia’s history:

Its neighbours have so often regarded its independence as a strategic question, while Georgians have regarded it as an existential one.

Can a small nation preserve its freedom without becoming dependent on a powerful neighbour?

It can try, but there is no universal formula, and geography matters enormously.

A small nation has several possible instruments:

Diplomacy:

Maintaining relationships with several powers rather than relying on one.

Collective security:

Seeking guarantees through alliances or international institutions.

Armed neutrality:

Developing enough defensive capacity to make coercion costly, while avoiding entanglement in great-power conflicts.

Economic resilience:

Avoiding dependence on a single neighbour for trade, energy, transport or essential resources.

Internal cohesion:

Maintaining institutions and a shared political identity strong enough to withstand external pressure.

None guarantees independence.

And even a nation that avoids formal dependence may find its choices constrained by geography, economics or military realities.

Georgia’s predicament was particularly difficult.

It lay between powerful neighbours, with no easy route to security that did not involve somebody else’s interests.

Erekle II’s decision to seek Russian protection in 1783 was not necessarily foolish.

He was trying to preserve his Kingdom in circumstances where the alternatives were also dangerous.

The tragedy was that the protection he sought became the means by which the protecting power eventually absorbed his kingdom.

Is it folly to trust an empire?

It is dangerous to assume that an empire’s interests and your own will remain aligned.

An empire may honour an agreement when doing so serves its purposes.

It may disregard that agreement when circumstances change.

It may even sincerely believe that its own expansion is beneficial to the people whose independence it removes.

That is the difficulty with a relationship between unequal powers.

The smaller party may understand the agreement as a guarantee of survival.

The larger party may regard it as an instrument of strategy.

The Treaty of Georgievsk illustrates this painfully.

Erekle sought protection while retaining his Kingdom.

Russia ultimately abolished that Kingdom.

And when Tbilisi was devastated in 1795, the protection had not been forthcoming.

Yet I would hesitate to call Erekle’s decision folly.

He was choosing among imperfect possibilities, not between a safe option and an obviously disastrous one.

And here is the historical paradox that I think is worth remembering when we return to Baratashvili:

In 1783, Georgia sought Russian protection against the threat of losing its independence.

In 1989, Abkhazians and South Ossetians sought Russian protection against the possibility of losing their distinct political and cultural identities within an independent Georgia.

The historical circumstances were very different, but the underlying dilemma has a familiar shape:

A smaller community turns to a powerful neighbour because it fears the intentions of the larger political entity to which it belongs.

There is something particularly poignant about Baratashvili’s position in 1832.

The adults around him had tried to recover Georgia’s independence through conspiracy.

Their attempt failed.

Some were imprisoned, others exiled, and some eventually returned to public life under Russian rule.

Baratashvili was young enough to witness the consequences but too young to have shaped the events.

I wonder whether this helps explain the political and emotional tension in The Fate of Georgia.

The debate between Erekle II and Solomon Lionidze is not simply about whether Russia can be trusted.

It is about the terrible choices facing a small nation:

Preserve what remains by accepting protection.

Or risk destruction in the pursuit of freedom.

And perhaps there is a question beneath all this:

When does the price of protection become greater than the danger from which we sought protection?

That question belongs to Georgia’s history, certainly.

But it is also a question that small nations have had to confront repeatedly.

I would not presume to tell Baratashvili what he thought at 15.

But I suspect the failure of the 1832 conspiracy would have made the question of freedom very real to him, long before he had the language or experience to answer it.

I would not claim that Dodashvili’s arrest, Grigol’s experiences or any particular conversation directly caused the poem.

We do not have that evidence.

But I think we can say that the poem arose from a world in which these experiences and arguments were inseparable.

Above: Nikoloz Baratashvili

I imagine Nikoloz hobbling through the streets of Tbilisi.

I imagine his teacher’s absence from the classroom.

I imagine the boy learning that his teacher Dodashvili has been arrested.

I imagine his thoughts as he writes to Grigol and the pleasure of receiving a letter from this, his uncle-brother.

I imagine the young poet contemplating Georgia’s past and uncertain future.

I imagine the room in which he writes, the light, the weather, the sounds outside.

I am not claiming to know Baratashvili’s private thoughts.

I am approaching him across nearly two centuries, acknowledging the distance and the cultural differences between us, while attempting to understand the man.

And perhaps that is the most appropriate way to write about someone whose surviving letters and poems offer only glimpses of a life, but never the complete person.

“I imagine” is not an apology for speculation.

It is an honest declaration of this writer’s method.

I am beginning to see a young man in a particular time and place.

A boy with a physical limitation.

A teacher whose place in the classroom becomes empty.

An uncle who remains a trusted correspondent.

A country whose political future is uncertain.

And a language in which the young man can still express himself.

The historical research is giving me the setting. “

“I imagine” is allowing me to bring the human story into focus.

A young man, sitting at a desk, writing in Georgian.

Outside that room, the political circumstances of his country are largely beyond his control.

His teacher has been exiled.

His uncle has experienced the consequences of political dissent.

His own ambitions have been constrained by his physical condition.

But he can still write.

He can still communicate with someone who understands him.

He can still give expression to his thoughts in his own language.

And in 1839, he can write The Fate of Georgia, looking back at a king who faced an impossible choice between protection and independence.

I am not suggesting that we know Baratashvili sat at a particular desk in precisely these circumstances.

This is an image that brings together documented elements, not a reconstructed historical fact.

But it might give us a centre of gravity.

Why did he write The Fate of Georgia?

Because the fate of his homeland was a question that mattered to him, one that he had inherited from the people, history and circumstances surrounding him.

The first is about the emergence of a writer.

The second is about the subject he chose to address.

And perhaps the two are inseparable.

I would also be interested in exploring whether the poem itself represents an act of service.

Not service imposed by an employer, government or military authority, but service freely chosen:

The contribution of an individual who believes that his country deserves a voice.

One caution, though:

We should not assume that Nikoloz consciously saw each disappointment as a reason to become a poet.

We can establish some of the circumstances.

The way he understood them internally is partly beyond our reach.

I imagine gives room to explore that honestly.

But I would preserve this thought:

He may have been denied several opportunities to serve, but he was not without the means to contribute.

And he chose to write.

I am not saying that writing was a consolation prize.

I am not looking at writing in relation to what Nikoloz could not do.

I am looking at how his circumstances helped reveal what he could do — and, more importantly, what he was meant to contribute.

The distinction is between compensation and discovery.

His physical disability, his family’s financial difficulties, his teacher’s exile, his uncle’s experiences and his own disappointments in love were not necessarily a series of obstacles that drove him towards poetry.

They were experiences through which his understanding of himself and his place in the world developed.

Perhaps he came to recognise that his contribution to Georgia would not be made on a battlefield, in a university or through public office.

It would be made through literature.

And that gives The Fate of Georgia another dimension.

He is not merely writing about his homeland.

He is participating in its cultural life, asserting that Georgia has a history, a language, a memory and a future worth contemplating.

Nikoloz did not discover writing because other avenues were closed to him.

He discovered his purpose through the experiences that shaped him.

We should be careful not to claim that this was his conscious reasoning, but as an interpretation of his development, it is compelling.

I am saying that his obstacles and past revealed what his purpose was.

I have often told my students that the two greatest days of their lives are the day that they were born and the day they understand why.

Did Nikoloz set out to become a poet?

Or did he gradually realize that he already was one?

A lifetime of being told what you cannot do does not diminish the importance of what you can do.

One distinction I would preserve, however:

Writing is not necessarily a substitute for freedom.

It may preserve something that political power cannot easily extinguish, but it does not restore the freedoms that have been lost.

And perhaps that is where the nightingale becomes especially interesting.

The nightingale can sing in a cage.

Its song survives.

But the cage remains.

Baratashvili died of malaria in Ganja at the age of 27.

His influence was long delayed, but as the next generation of Georgian literati rediscovered his lyrics, he was posthumously published, between 1861 and 1876, and idolized.

His reinterment from Ganja to Tbilisi in 1893 turned into a national celebration.

Since 1938, his remains have lain in the Mtatsminda Pantheon in Tbilisi.

Above: Mtatsminda Pantheon, Tbilisi, Georgia

I think there is more than one possible message here:

Nikoloz is too lame to be a soldier, too poor to become the scholar he would like to be, but he has one talent:

He can write.

In this he can serve his homeland.

He may not win the love of his beloved.

Yet he can love and extol the glory of love, requited or not.

His teacher may be absent, but his lessons are part of his philosophy.

His uncle-brother may be distant, yet his influence prompts Nikoloz’s spirit.

Nikoloz writes because he believes he has something to say.

It is tempting to describe writing as the compensation for everything he could not do.

I would hesitate, though.

That risks making his poetry sound like a consolation prize.

Perhaps writing was not merely what remained available to him.

It was what he discovered he could do exceptionally well.

He could not serve Georgia as a soldier, but he could explore its history, its identity and its future.

He could not enter the university he had hoped for, but he could educate himself and develop a literary voice.

He could not keep his teacher beside him, but he could carry his lessons forward.

He could not command the affection of the woman he loved, but he could give expression to the experience of loving.

There is a wonderful independence in that.

I am not describing a man who turned to poetry because other possibilities were denied him.

I am describing a man whose abilities and contribution should be judged on their own merits, not against a list of things he could not do.

A lifetime of being told what you cannot do does not diminish the importance of what you can do.

And applied to Nikoloz, that is a powerful proposition.

He could not pursue a military career.

That tells us nothing about the value of his literary contribution.

He could not afford the education he desired.

That does not diminish his intellectual curiosity or achievement.

He could not keep his teacher or uncle constantly at his side.

Their influence nevertheless remained.

He could not secure the love he wanted.

That did not deprive him of the capacity to love.

His limitations were part of his circumstances, not the measure of his worth.

Perhaps this is where we should begin to understand the young Baratashvili:

Not as a tragic figure defined by what life withheld from him, but as a person who recognized the significance of what he had to offer.

And there is a further possibility.

When Nikoloz writes The Fate of Georgia, he is himself exercising a form of agency.

He cannot determine the political fate of his country, but he can examine it, question it and give it expression.

He cannot change the past.

He can influence how his contemporaries understand it.

He cannot command the future.

He can contribute to the conversation about it.

That is not consolation.

That is participation.

This ties to the dinner that began this post.

The dignity of the individual and the importance of acknowledging that person for who they are rather than for their utility.

At dinner, I felt that my value to the other guests might have been measured by your usefulness:

My generosity, my willingness to pay, my ability to facilitate conversation.

With Nikoloz, we encounter a society in which a person’s opportunities and perceived usefulness could be constrained by physical ability, wealth, family circumstances and political authority.

But there is a distinction worth preserving:

The worth of an individual is not determined by the role that individual can perform.

Nikoloz was not less worthy because he could not become a soldier.

He was not less intellectually capable because he could not afford university.

His contribution as a poet did not require permission from those who might have judged him by those limitations.

And perhaps the same principle applies to the country he wrote about.

Georgia’s worth was not determined by its military strength, its usefulness to Russia, or its strategic position between competing empires.

Worth his salt?

There is a common thread here, although we mustn’t pretend the circumstances are equivalent:

A person is more than what he can provide.

A nation is more than what it can offer a powerful neighbour.

Recognition is not the same as appreciation of usefulness.

Dignity should not have to be earned through service to somebody else’s interests.

The success of his poetry, unheralded less in his lifetime than the legacy restored decades after his death, was never as important as the expression of who he was as an individual.

The poet did not need posterity’s applause to justify having written.

His poetry mattered because it was an expression of his thoughts, his feelings, his intellectual independence and his understanding of the world around him.

Whether it was widely read, celebrated or even properly understood during his lifetime did not determine its worth.

There is a lovely, rather poignant distinction here:

Recognition after death honours the work.

Recognition during life acknowledges the person.

Neither creates the intrinsic worth of the individual.

It is the trying that is significant.

Baratashvili could have easily stopped trying, could easily have surrendered to despair.

Bullied boys might never become emperors.

Patent clerks might never become professors.

Freedom might never be realized if no one strives against the impossible.

None of them knows the outcome when the decision to strive is made.

How easy it is to surrender to the security of the moment.

“This is what I have.

Why risk it for something I might never have?”

Certainly, we could look at Erekle’s decision to seek Russia’s help as a mistake, but in the King’s defence he sought to maintain independence in a predatory neighbourhood.

It is the determination to strive that marks a man far more than his recognized victories.

Yes, there are forces beyond our control that shape our destiny, whether we speak on a personal or a national level.

But we do not know what we can accomplish until we decide to try.

“This is what I have.

Why risk it for something I might never have?”

It is a persuasive argument for accepting limitations, avoiding uncertainty and preserving what little security one possesses.

Sometimes that is prudent.

There are risks that should not be taken, and striving can become stubbornness when circumstances demand reconsideration.

But there is also a danger in making security the highest objective.

A person can preserve the circumstances of the present at the expense of every possibility of the future.

A nation can accept protection at the expense of self-determination.

An individual can become so accustomed to being told what is impossible that he eventually stops asking what might be possible.

The forces that determine our circumstances do not necessarily determine the extent of our efforts.

We cannot guarantee that striving will succeed.

We cannot even know whether our efforts will be recognized.

But refusing to try guarantees that certain possibilities will never be realized.

I am not asking the world to reward my generosity, any more than Baratashvili needed posterity to reward his poetry.

I am asking whether we can retain our dignity and continue to act according to our convictions, even when the response from others is disappointing.

I would not make this an argument for endless perseverance at any cost.

Sometimes changing direction is itself an act of courage.

But abandoning the pursuit of something worthwhile simply because its achievement is uncertain is another matter.

A man’s fate may be shaped by forces beyond his control, but the measure of his character is often found in what he chooses to do in their presence.

Above: Kevin Kline, Dave (1993)

“It’s about respect.

It’s about looking in the mirror and knowing that you’ve done something valuable with your day.

And if one person could start to feel this way, and then another person, and then another person, soon all these other problems may not seem so impossible.

You don’t really know how much you can do until you stand up and decide to try.“

To understand the poet, I needed to understand his affection for Ekaterine.

To understand his intellectual world, I encountered his uncle Grigol Orbeliani and his teacher Solomon Dodashvili.

To understand their generation, I had to examine the conspiracy of 1832.

To understand that conspiracy, I had to go back to the loss of Georgian independence, the Treaty of Georgievsk, the destruction of Tbilisi in 1795, and the competing ambitions of Persia, the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

And now the subject is no longer simply Baratashvili.

It is the lives of people caught between personal destiny and historical forces beyond their control.

Baratashvili did not live to see the recognition that followed.

But he had written.

He had tried.

And Georgia has not forgotten.

By Canada Slim

Teacher, Barrista, Writer, World Explorer, Lover, Modest! Canadian Adrift in the Wild Wild East of Switzerland Walker, Wanderer, Wordsmith a Stranger is a Friend I Haven't Met Yet!

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